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Abstract 
Over the past thirty years, the Single European Market has been the core business of the 
European Union, and enormous progress has been achieved in both ‘widening’ the economic 
activities covered by EU legislation and ‘deepening’ the acquis to overcome emerging gaps in 
integration in areas already covered by legislation. And yet, empirical evidence indicates that 
market integration has stalled on many fronts and, more importantly, that the expected 
economic benefits of integration in terms of higher growth of incomes, jobs, and productivity 
have fallen short of expectations, notably in the long-established EU-15 member states. The 
situation has not improved since the introduction of the euro.  
This paper reviews the main developments in Single European Market (SEM) legislation and 
regulatory activities over the past three decades; it summarises the results of the SEM 
programme in market integration, highlighting areas where gaps appear to be more evident; 
and discusses the impact of economic integration within the SEM, including aspects that play 
an important role in feeding popular resistance to integration. 
Keywords: Single European Market, regulatory models, free movements, goods, persons, 
capital, services. 
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Thirty Years of the  
Single European Market 
Stefano Micossi* 
CEPS Special Report No. 148 / October 2016 
Introduction 
Over the past thirty years the Single European Market (henceforth SEM) has been the core 
business of the European Union, and enormous progress has been achieved in both ‘widening’ 
the economic activities covered by EU legislation and in ‘deepening’ the acquis to overcome 
emerging gaps in integration in areas already covered by legislation (Pelkmans 2011). And yet, 
empirical evidence indicates that market integration has stalled on many fronts and, more 
importantly, that the expected economic benefits of integration in terms of higher growth of 
incomes, jobs and productivity have fallen short of expectations, notably in the long-
established EU-15 member states. The situation has not improved since the introduction of the 
euro.  
The purpose of this paper is to review the main developments in SEM legislation and 
regulatory activities over the past three decades; to summarise the results of the SEM 
programme in market integration, highlighting the areas where gaps appear to be more 
significant; and to discuss the impact of economic integration within the SEM, including 
aspects that play an important role in feeding popular resistance to integration. Although SEM 
policies for financial services will be discussed, recent developments in the Banking Union 
and Commission proposals for a Capital Markets Union will not be covered, except for aspects 
of general relevance for the SEM’s broad architecture.  
The paper is written from the perspective of an economist who has devoted much of his 
professional life to matters of economic and monetary integration in Europe, and who, by 
necessity, has become keenly aware of the importance of legal and institutional arrangements 
in the functioning of economic systems. Particular attention will be paid to the issues of 
economic incentives in institutional design, while steering away from the detailed legal 
complexities and controversies surrounding SEM laws.  
                                                     
* Stefano Micossi is Director General of Assonime, a business association and think tank in Rome. He 
has taught at the College of Europe since 1991, with an interruption during his stint at the European 
Commission (where he served as Director General of Industry in 2005-08), until the academic year 2015-
16. He chairs the LUISS School of European Political Economy (SEP) and is a member of the boards of 
CEPS, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and the CIR Group. 
The author is grateful to Fabrizia Peirce and Aurora Saija for in-depth discussions and outstanding help 
in searching the bibliography and the data sources, and to Ginevra Bruzzone for reading the full draft 
and providing useful suggestions for improvement. He remains solely responsible for remaining errors 
and omissions.  
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1. Overview 
The goal of economic integration constituted the principal focus of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
in the specific form of the establishment of a common internal market, characterised by the 
freedom of movement of goods, services and productive factors (labour and capital). Its 
distinguishing feature was, in addition to being a free trade area and a custom union with a 
common external tariff, the aim of eliminating ‘technical’ barriers arising from national rules 
for the protection of health, safety and the environment, and to a limited extent of tax barriers 
as well. 
Three features stand out in this regard (Craig 2003). First, integration entails not only the 
elimination of barriers (‘negative’ integration) but also the harmonisation of legislation that 
provides standards of protection of worthy goals of general interest (‘positive’ integration) 
applicable throughout the SEM. Second, the elimination and prevention of barriers also 
concerns behaviour that may distort the level playing field in the SEM after the market has 
been opened, i.e. by means of public subsidies and protections granted in the domestic market 
to national players or anti-competitive actions by national players. These distortions are 
addressed through competition policy and in particular state aid policy – a policy unique to 
the European construction that directly constrains the member states. Third, market opening 
and liberalisation do not preclude public intervention, e.g. environmental protection through 
the Common Agricultural Policy or cohesion policies to help weaker economies withstand the 
impact of market opening. Common policies will normally be administered by the 
Commission – often under Council oversight through specialised Council committees. 
Already in the early years of the Economic Community, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
emerged as a fundamental player in the integration process through its adjudication of cases 
and ‘preliminary’ rulings on questions raised by national courts regarding the treaty’s 
interpretation. Its central role in the development of the SEM came to the fore with early 
decisions establishing the direct effect 1  and the supremacy over national legislation 2  of 
Community rules in areas of Community competence. They laid the ground for landmark 
decisions such as Reyners,3 Dassonville4 and Cassis de Dijon,5 with paramount consequences 
for the subsequent evolution of legislation.  
The SEM programme was formally launched in June 1985 by the Commission White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market, endorsed by the European Council in Milan at the end of the 
same month. Its main message, which built upon the Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence, was that 
there was no need to seek harmonisation when barriers to free movement would come down 
under the rule of reason of equivalent protection. Henceforth, harmonisation measures would 
be limited to restrictions that could be justified under the mandatory grounds allowed by the 
Treaty, and, therefore, could only be eliminated by legislation raising the common level of 
                                                     
1 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos vs. Administratie der Belastingen [1963]. 
2 Case 6/64, Costa vs. Enel [1964]. 
3 Case 2/74, Reyners vs. Belgian State [1974] recognizing direct effect to freedom of establishment to 
what is now Article 47 of TFEU.  
4 Case 8/74, Procurer du Roi vs. Benôit and Gustave Dassonville [1974]. 
5 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG vs. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] establishing 
the principle of mutual recognition of national rules and thus opening the way to the application of 
Article 34 TFEU to indistinctly applicable national rules.  
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protection in that particular area, recognising the legitimate concerns of member states and 
restoring free movement.  
The White Paper included proposals for Treaty changes that would simplify and speed up the 
legislative process. In the ensuing months, an intergovernmental conference swiftly reached 
an agreement on those proposals, leading to the Single European Act (SEA) that was signed 
in February 1986. After ratification by member states, it entered into force on 1 July 1987. The 
SEA provided the definition of the SEM as an “area without frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured” (now in Article 26 of TFEU)6 
and introduced (qualified) majority voting in the Council for SEM measures, together with a 
new cooperation procedure with the European Parliament, which later led to full co-decision 
under the Maastricht Treaty. Under the new legal basis for SEM measures (Article 100a TEEC,7 
now 114 TFEU) the Commission developed the New Approach to SEM legislation, limiting 
legislative measures to setting the essential requirements of protection, while confining 
technical specifications to voluntary standards developed by European standardisation 
bodies.  
The economic rationale of the SEM programme lay in the belief that market opening would 
revive the feeble European economy by fostering concentration and the exploitation of 
economies of scale in industry, improving the allocation of productive resources, and raising 
productivity. The 1988 Cecchini Report described at considerable length the structural 
weaknesses of the European economy and its specialisation in sectors with low growth 
potential, and held out the promise that completion of the SEM programme would bring 
substantial economic benefits (ranging from 4.25 to 6.5% of GDP). 
The White Paper tabled some 300 harmonisation measures, mainly in the domain of goods, 
which by and large were approved by the statutory deadline of 1992 (cf. Pelkmans 2008 and 
2011); additional liberalisation directives were enacted in the ensuing years for opening to 
competition services – notably network industries (starting with telecoms and moving on to 
energy, transport, and postal services) and financial services.  
In network industries, the presence of increasing returns and, sometimes, natural monopoly 
market structures, inevitably pushed SEM initiatives beyond market opening into the domain 
of regulation to ensure open access by competitors and a level playing field in the provision 
of services to final users. Network services were normally also services of general interest; 
Article 86 TEC8 (now 106 TFEU) provided the flexible framework required to ensure that free 
movement and competition rules would apply to these services without compromising their 
specific mission (European Commission 2000b). The tensions with some member states on the 
delicate balance between national social preferences and SEM rules led, with the Amsterdam 
and Nice Treaties, to a new provision – Article 16 TEC, now 14 TFEU – reaffirming the special 
role of services of general interest in the “shared values of the Union”. Protocol 26 to the 
treaties clarifies that this includes respecting the autonomy of national authorities, at all levels 
of government, in deciding on public services and organising their provision, although the 
Union will continue to scrutinise whether the means of provision are consistent with SEM 
rules. 
                                                     
6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
7 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.  
8 Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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Further advancements in SEM policies were achieved by strengthening ‘accompanying 
policies’, e.g., with the approval of the Merger Regulation,9 on the one hand, and the new 
economic cohesion policies and R&D policies, supported by substantial budgetary resources, 
on the other. These measures are complementary, as weaker economies are provided with 
extra resources to withstand increased competitive pressure stemming from market opening 
and the expected concentration of industry. The single currency was created to reinforce the 
integration and competition effects of the SEM by improving price transparency, reducing the 
costs of cross-border transactions, and eliminating the exchange rate risk.10 For reasons that 
are not yet fully understood, while there have been positive effects on growth, market 
integration has been less pronounced than anticipated, with the productivity performance of 
many euro area members worsening rather than improving (more on this later).  
Once the wave of legislation prompted by the White Paper was completed, it soon became 
evident that important economic activities were not covered and that, in many respects, 
existing legislation fell short of bringing about genuine integration (Pelkmans 2011). The 
changing economic environment, including globalisation, the development of new 
technologies and the increased prominence of environmental issues in public policy, also 
greatly contributed to the legislative agenda, with new demands from the public and member 
states (‘widening’), and a continuing need to review and adapt existing legislation 
(‘deepening’). This is reflected in the multiplication of strategic reviews and new plans to 
‘complete’ the SEM (cf. Annex 1 in High-Level Panel of Experts, 2016). In fact, completion of 
the SEM has become a moving target, requiring continuing adaptation. A summary of the 
White Paper’s main initiatives and subsequent legislation is presented in Table 1. 
The Monti Report (Monti 2010) highlighted a strand of ideas that had been building up in SEM 
strategies over the previous decade; that is the socio-political legitimacy problems 
surrounding market opening and the need to (re-)build popular consensus around SEM goals. 
The Report stresses the importance of harnessing the SEM for the benefits of consumers, 
promoting green growth strategies and reviewing the appropriate balance between SEM 
freedoms and workers’ rights and expectations, which had been especially strained by the 
SEM rules on the posting of workers and related ECJ decisions, e.g. Laval.11  
Over time, these broader goals found Treaty recognition with new chapters on consumer 
protection, social policies and employment.12  
                                                     
9 Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, now Regulation (EC) 139/2004. 
10 In the 2000s, the euro sovereign debt crisis reintroduced a re-denomination risk that widened the 
spreads between borrowing rates in the periphery and those prevailing in the ‘core’ countries, thus 
reversing integration and re-creating significant financial markets fragmentation.  
11  Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri vs. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007]. The 
Monti Report was followed by a flurry of measures under the hats of the Single Market Acts I and II, on 
a broad front of themes (consumer empowerment, social entrepreneurship and SMEs financing, 
business environment, and taxation) and activities (digital market, utilities, services, and IPR), which 
however did not significantly advanced integration. 
12 With the Lisbon Treaty, they came to full prominence in Article 3 TEU, setting the Union goals of a 
“competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. ... [The Union] shall combat social 
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Table 1. Single European Market (1985-2015): Overview 
Goods 
 
 Mutual recognition (ECJ, Cassis de Dijon 1979) 
 Under the Single European Act (1986), SEM a Community task; a new 
legislative procedure by QMV (with EP co-decision) and harmonisation of 
essential requirements 
 Optional technical standards for compliance  
Services 
(establishment 
and cross-border 
supply) 
 ECJ: from discrimination to restriction  ‘market access’ test and ‘general 
good’ principle (Vlassopoulou 1989 and Gebhard 1994 on right of 
establishment; Sager 1990 and Gouda 1989 on freedom to provide services) 
General Regime 
 
 Framework Dir. 2006/123  horizontal principles applicable to all 
services, except for services already harmonised and some specific 
activities 
Financial Markets   Single passport based on harmonised criteria for national licences 
 Home country supervision of financial institutions; host country control 
for business conduct, consumer protection and ‘systemic’ stability of host 
market 
 Investment services and financial market infrastructure (MiFID II 2014/65, 
MiFIR 600/2014) 
 European System of Financial Supervision comprising: (i) the European 
Systemic Risk Board; (ii) the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, 
EIOPA, ESMA) 
 The Banking Union package: Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single 
Resolution Mechanism and Directives on national guarantees schemes and 
national resolution schemes; CRD IV package for capital requirements and 
prudential supervision 
Services of 
General Interest 
 Amsterdam Treaty introduces article 14 TFEU, further supported by 
Protocol 26 on SGI 
Network 
Industries 
 For telecoms, gas and electricity, postal services, rails: market opening 
(different progress) and pro-competitive regulation (access to network, 
separation of service provision from infrastructure); in some cases 
establishment of universal service obligations 
 EU regulatory networks to complement national authorities (e.g., BEREC, 
ACER) 
 Liberalisation measures for air, road and maritime transport 
Capital   Full freedom of movement (Dir. 88/361)  
 Transparency and market integrity: Prospectus (Dir. 2003/71, under 
review); Transparency (Dir. 2004/109, as amended in 2013); Market abuse 
(Reg. 596/2014 and Dir. 2014/57 harmonising criminal sanctions); 
Shareholders’ Rights (Dir. 2007/36) 
 Market for corporate control: Takeover Dir. 2004/25 
 Company mobility: European Company Statute (Dir 2001/86 on workers 
participation; Reg. 2157/2001 on establishment and governance of the 
company’real seat’ approach, partly reversed by the ECJ)  
 Capital Market Union Action Plan 2015 
                                                     
exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice ... It shall promote economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States ...”. 
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Table 1. Single European Market (1985-2015): Overview 
Persons  
Workers  Workers’ mobility and residence right, equal treatment in working 
conditions, and social and tax benefits (Reg. 492/2011) 
 Supplementary pension rights (Dir. 98/49); coordination of social 
security systems (Reg. 883/2004) 
 Posted workers Dir. 96/71 (under review)  
Professionals 
 
 Mutual recognition of professional qualifications with minimum training 
requirements; from sectoral directives to horizontal approach (Dir. 
2005/36, as amended by Dir. 2013/55  EU professional card) 
Individuals  Maastricht Treaty  introduction of EU citizenship, including the right 
to circulate and reside freely in the EU 
  Comprehensive discipline of free movement and residence (temporary 
and permanent) for EU citizens and their families in Dir. 2004/38 
Horizontal   
Public Procurement  Coordination of the procurement procedures for the award of public 
works, public supply and public service contracts above certain value 
thresholds (with separate rules for public utility sectors): Dir. 2014/24 
and Dir. 2014/25 
 New rules for concessions (Dir. 2014/23), imposing minimum 
requirements for selection and award criteria and limited duration 
IPR  Harmonised rules on copyright (Dir. 2001/29) trademarks (Dir. 
2015/2436), industrial design (Dir. 98/71), biotechnological inventions 
(Dir. 98/44), and trade secrets (Dir. 2016/943) 
 EU-wide rights: EU trademark (Reg. 207/2009 as amended by Reg. 
2015/2424); Community design (Reg. 6/2002); Unitary patent (Reg. 
1257/2012 and Reg. 1260/2012)  
 Procedures to enforce IPR against counterfeiting and piracy (Dir. 
2004/48); Unified Patent Court, not yet operational 
Consumer and 
Data Protection 
 Health and safety: general product safety Dir. 2001/95; food safety Reg. 
178/2002 
 Consumers’ economic interests: minimum harmonisation on liability for 
defective products (Dir. 85/374), sales and guarantees (Dir. 1999/44), 
consumer credit (Dir. 2008/48), unfair contract terms (Dir. 93/13), 
package travel (Dir. 2015/2302); maximum harmonisation approach for 
unfair commercial practices (Dir. 2005/29) and consumers’ rights (Dir. 
2011/83, including distance contracts and right of withdrawal)  
 Cooperation among national enforcers of consumer law (Reg. 2006/2004, 
under review) 
 General Data Protection Reg. 2016/679; e-privacy (Dir. 2002/58) 
Digital Economy 
 
 E-commerce (Dir. 2000/21): information requirements for online 
activities and contracts, transparency of commercial communications, 
limitation of service providers’ liability 
 Electronic identification (Reg. 910/2014), e-money (Dir. 2009/110), 
payment services (Dir. 2015/2366) 
 Digital Single Market Strategy (2015) including legislative proposals on 
consumer protection in online sales, parcel delivery, geo-blocking 
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Two main market opening initiatives in the past decade concerned services in general and 
financial services specifically. The first one was prompted by a Commission Report on The 
State of the Internal Market for Services (European Commission 2002) which thoroughly 
described the sorry state of integration in this sector, the main legal barriers and their impact 
on the economy, notably on small-medium enterprises (SMEs) and consumers. The Services 
Directive,13 approved by Council and Parliament in 2006 and expected to enter into force in 
2009, provided an adequate response but, as will be shown, implementation has been wanting.  
The second initiative is a decade-long attempt to integrate financial markets and set up a 
supranational regulatory structure for financial services, in response to repeated bouts of 
financial instability. Two reports, one prepared at the beginning of the last decade under the 
chairmanship of Alexandre Lamfalussy (leading to the so-called Financial Services Action 
Plan, to be completed by 2005) and the other prepared by Jacques de Larosière at the end of 
the decade, mapped out comprehensive interventions to remove remaining restrictions to 
securities markets and create a new regulatory system able to avoid a repeat of the dramatic 
financial crisis of 2008-09.14 The euro area sovereign debt and banking crisis, at the beginning 
of this decade, convinced governments and regulators to raise the stakes and go for a full 
Banking Union (already well advanced at the time of writing) and Capital Markets Union (as 
yet at an early stage of design). 
Horizontal legislative measures of increasing ambition have covered public procurement – for 
goods, services, public works and concessions – still stubbornly protected by national 
procurement authorities, and the markets for coded technology (IPR). The latter is obviously 
of paramount importance for encouraging Europe-wide circulation of new technology and its 
innovative applications, in a continent that has tended to privilege the protection of the 
investor over the diffusion of new ideas.  
Finally, in recent years, a comprehensive initiative has aimed to establish a Digital Single 
Market, in order to allow the Union to exploit the full economic potential of ICT technologies 
(European Commission 2015a). The programme covers a broad range of themes and activities, 
organised around the three pillars of i) consumer and business access to online markets across 
the Union, ii) the legal and competitive environment and iii) secure and trustworthy 
infrastructures.  
2. An Innovative Regulatory Model 
The SEM is built on an innovative regulatory model that aims to open the markets of member 
states to free movement while respecting, as much as possible, the diversity of national 
institutions and regulatory approaches. It is a sui generis model of integration with diversity 
without precedent in regulatory history, enabling the different national rulebooks for safety, 
health and consumer protection to coexist and apply at the same time within each member 
state’s jurisdiction. 
                                                     
13 Directive 2006/123/EC. 
14 In line with parallel reforms on the US side with the Dodd-Frank legislation and the comprehensive 
review of prudential rules for banking agreed upon by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors, 
transposed at the EU level with the CRR/CRD IV package of 2013 (including Directive 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) 575/2013).  
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This approach was built on the landmark Cassis de Dijon decision by the ECJ (1978), which 
established the principle of mutual recognition of national rules. With one stroke a myriad of 
technical barriers to free movement of goods were made illegal, thus relieving the European 
Commission of the task of seeking new legislation to bring them down. The decision was 
followed by other decisions refining the principle and extending its application to services and 
to persons seeking to move to another member state to reside and work.  
The next required building block was a more flexible legal basis to enable legislation on the 
SEM, and this was provided by the SEA with new the Article 100a TEEC (now Article 114 
TFEU). Under this legal basis, harmonisation was based on three lines of action (Craig 2003):  
(i) Substantive legislation to harmonise safety, health and consumer protection legislation 
by laying down essential health and safety requirements, and European standardisation 
to offer an optional means of compliance with harmonised requirements providing a 
presumption of conformity;  
(ii) Procedurally oriented legislation to improve transparency of information on national 
technical standards and regulations, and later on for public procurement; with Directive 
83/189/EEC,15 failure to notify the EC network of mutual evaluation of these measures 
would make them null and void; the information network, originally conceived for 
goods, was later extended to cover technical measures for services;  
(iii) Extension of mutual recognition by legislation, notably in the recognition of professional 
qualifications and the services directive. 
The combination of the principle of mutual recognition with the three pillars of legislative 
activity brings about a radical shift in economic philosophy: market opening is placed at the 
centre of economic policies not only to foster growth, but also to improve the welfare of 
citizens (Barnard 2013, Weiler 1999). Majority voting means that governments may, 
sometimes, be obliged to accept substantial departures from their national policies and 
regulatory traditions. While the prevailing consensual culture in Europe usually translates 
into a reluctance to decide by majority voting, the very possibility of coming to a vote makes 
Council members better disposed to compromise.  
Common policies have been sensitive to member states’ and citizens’ concerns, and have 
developed their tools so as to strike an acceptable balance between the community goal of free 
movement and national preferences in shaping protections. To follow are some paramount 
examples of these frictions and the resulting balancing acts, which have often entailed 
remarkable creativity and innovation in drafting SEM rules. When referring to legal aspects of 
the SEM, I will mainly follow the outstanding volume by Catherine Barnard (2013), while 
steering away from interpretative debates. 
(a) Market access 
The building blocks of the new model of legislation prompted by the White Paper are in two 
landmark ECJ decisions, Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, as already mentioned. Dassonville 
first established the definition of ‘measures having an equivalent effect’ to a quantitative 
restriction to trade prohibited by Article 34 (and 35) TFEU as follows: “all trading rules enacted 
                                                     
15 Later on, directive 98/34/EC and now directive (EU) 2015/1535. 
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by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-Union trade ...”. Later decisions further clarified the term ‘rules’ as to include policies 
(such as a ‘buy Irish’ campaign by the Irish government) and administrative practices.16 This 
very broad definition already anticipates the ‘market access’ principle extensively used later 
by the ECJ for the liberalisation of establishment, the cross-border supply of services and the 
recognition of professional qualifications.   
A further building block is the distinction between ‘distinctly applicable’ measures,17 which 
openly discriminate against imported products, and ‘indistinctly applicable’ measures which, 
while not discriminatory, may nonetheless create obstacles to free circulation. The latter lay at 
the core of the Cassis de Dijon case; they are the result of disparities in national legislations 
concerning the marketing of products. The ECJ ruled that those measures must be complied 
with by the product trying to enter a member state’s market different from the member state 
of origin, only if they are recognised as necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements 
“relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, 
the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer”.18 Otherwise, they 
cannot be used to restrict free entry into the domestic market. Moreover, those measures 
should be proportionate to the aim in question and should satisfy a criterion of ‘least 
restriction’ to the free movement of goods in the choice between alternative measures that may 
achieve the same result. 
Thus, after rejecting arguments by the German government wherein a national rule imposing 
a minimum alcoholic content for beverages was justified by mandatory requirements for the 
protection of health and consumers, the ECJ stated the basic principle of presumption of 
equivalence, or mutual recognition: it saw no valid reason why, “provided that they have been 
lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not 
be introduced into any other Member State”.  
The direct implication of Cassis de Dijon is that the producer’s home state regulation will, 
under normal circumstances, prevail over host state regulation where the product is sold and 
that the entry of a good can be refused only on grounds of the ‘imperative’ non-economic 
reasons listed in Article 36 TFEU, and the additional criteria developed in the ECJ 
jurisprudence on admissible mandatory requirements. The principle also has an important 
procedural implication: each member state must create a space for the evaluation of the rules 
of all the other member states within its administrative system, to ascertain whether a 
particular product qualifies for mutual recognition. Since the member states were less than 
enthusiastic disciples of mutual recognition, Regulation (EC) 764/2008 introduced 
administrative procedures to supplement judicial recourse when mutual recognition is 
denied. Under this procedure, the member state intending to prohibit the placing on the 
market of a product is obliged to explain the technical rule behind the prohibition and to set 
out the technical and scientific evidence justifying that decision.   
                                                     
16 Case 249/81, Commission vs. Ireland [1982]. 
17 Already stated in Article 2 of Directive 70/50/EEC.  
18 Later decisions clarified the fact that the mere existence of different rates of indirect taxation or any 
differential impact of national rules on competitive conditions would not represent per se a justification 
for restricting access to the domestic market under the consumer protection or fair trading grounds (e.g. 
Case 182/84, Miro BV. [1985]).  
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The ‘discrimination’ model implicit in Cassis de Dijon was gradually superseded by a stronger 
requirement of ‘market access’. With Sager, 19  the Court ruled that the prohibition of 
restrictions to the supply of services in Article 56 TFEU required not only the elimination of 
all discriminations on grounds of nationality but also the abolition of restrictions “liable to 
prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another 
Member State where he lawfully provides such services”.  
Two further decisions, Kraus20 and Gebhard,21 struck down national measures limiting the 
domestic use by nationals of academic titles earned abroad and of domestic titles in the 
exercise of a profession by a foreign EU national. The measures were not qualified as 
discriminatory; rather they were struck down as “liable to hamper or to render less attractive 
the exercise by Union nationals ... of the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty”. In subsequent cases, especially for persons and capital, the Court has gone even 
further, replacing the reference to market access by the simple reference to ‘obstacles’ or 
‘restrictions’ on free movement. 
As emphasised by Barnard (2013), this evolution has placed tighter constraints on a member 
state’s ability to regulate market access. Under the new approach any domestic regulation may 
be seen as an obstacle to access – whereas under the previous ‘discrimination’ approach certain 
restrictions to access could be maintained, provided they applied uniformly to all market 
participants. In fact, the principle of market access is so broad as to become ill-defined, opening 
the way to abusive exploitation of Treaty articles to oppose any national measure regulating 
economic activity, since almost by definition regulations may restrict profit margins and 
therefore reduce the attractiveness of pursuing one particular activity. The potential excesses 
of the market access principle have been addressed by the ECJ with a number of legal 
techniques, e.g. Keck22 and two Commission vs. Italy cases.23 But the problem refuses to go 
away, and has again come into full prominence with certain decisions limiting de facto the 
scope of union rights recognised under national legislation (cf. Laval, already mentioned, and 
Viking).24 
Thus, one arrives at the crux of the matter. The principle of open access, which is the 
cornerstone of SEM policies and the condition for effective competition, puts pressure on 
domestic institutional arrangements in a wide range of very sensitive domains, including 
standards of protection of consumers and the environment, labour market rules, public 
services, and even cultural products such as television and cinema. As a result, when choosing 
between competing products and services, or between potential locations of a professional 
activity or enterprise, Union citizens are implicitly also choosing between the institutions 
underpinning those activities. This has major consequences for private economic incentives 
                                                     
19 Case C-76/90, Säger vs. Dennemeyer [1991].  
20 Case C-19/92, Kraus vs. Land Baden-Württemberg [1993]. 
21 Case C-55/94, Gebhard vs. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995]. 
22 Joint cases C-267 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard [1993], where the Court recognised that ‘certain 
selling arrangements’ did not breach Article 34 TFEU. 
23 Case C-518/06 [2009] on motor insurance and Case C-565/08 [2011] on maximum lawyer fees.  
24 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union vs. Viking 
Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007]. 
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and national institutions, which must adapt to the common policies and the resulting changes 
in the economic and social environment. 
A major criticism levelled against this approach is that, by setting in motion a process of 
competition between institutions, it might foster a race to the bottom in the levels of protection, 
as countries seek to attract businesses to their jurisdiction. Of course, one must recognise that 
considerations related to the quality of products and locations normally play an important role 
in the expression of individual preferences. Price is therefore not the only variable taken into 
consideration. In other words, a higher quality of institutions may well determine the choice, 
even if this sometimes entails a higher price for a product or service, or a higher location cost. 
And yet, this criticism cannot be dismissed light-heartedly. Finding the right balance between 
SEM freedom and national societal preferences remains an unresolved issue and, on occasion, 
a source of severe tension between Union institutions and member states.  
(b) Article 114 TFEU  
Article 114 provides the ‘residual’ legal basis of SEM legislation, to be applied when the Treaty 
does not otherwise provide for a specific legal basis. It can only be used for the ‘approximation’ 
of laws and administrative practices, and not for other purposes related to the SEM. 25 
Important ECJ decisions26 on the so-called Tobacco Control Directive27 further clarified that 
Article 114 can be used to enact measures that contribute to the elimination of actual and 
potential obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, as well to remove distortions 
(actual and potential) of competition arising from national rules. It also clarified the fact that, 
under Article 114, the Union does not have the general legislative power to intervene to correct 
market failure in the SEM. 
A first important implication is that the need for SEM legislation only arises when there is a 
legitimate obstacle to trading within the SEM, as maintained under the imperative need 
exceptions recognised by the TFEU and the ECJ. When mutual recognition works there is no 
need to legislate. Moreover, legislation will target the elimination of those legitimate obstacles 
with measures adequate for removing the restriction, but goes no further. This opens the way 
to minimal harmonisation measures strictly commensurate with the restriction to be 
eliminated. It follows that, at least in principle, the Union’s ability to act is circumscribed by 
considerations of subsidiarity, under which it will not act without an obstacle, and 
proportionality, requiring that the constraints imposed on member states are the strict 
minimum required to restore free circulation. 
Two main issues were opened but not resolved by Cassis de Dijon. The first is how member 
states could demonstrate conformity to essential requirements (in a proportionate manner); 
the second is how member states could create sufficient trust in the incoming products 
claiming mutual recognition. This led to the development of a policy for conformity 
                                                     
25 Case C-436/03, European Parliament vs. Council of the European Union [2006]. 
26 Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany vs. European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union [2000] and Case C-74/99, The Queen vs. Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others [2000]. 
27 Directive 98/43/EC. 
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assessment. The response was a Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards (the ‘New Approach’) adopted by the Council of Ministers on 7 May 1985.28 
The principles of the New Approach laid the foundation for the establishment of the European 
standardisation system, as now defined by Regulation (EU) 1025/2012, built upon three pre-
existing standardisation organisations (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) that have evolved into the 
European Standardization Organizations. The strategic vision for European standardisation is 
illustrated in the European Commission (2011a) communication on standards, while the legal 
framework is set out in Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012. Reliance on standards for technical 
specifications has become an accepted principle of the WTO, which promotes use of 
international standards through its agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.   
An important feature of European standards is that, following publication in the Official 
Journal of the Union, their use is open to any interested manufacturer; accordingly, their 
definition and approval must respect strict procedural requirements to ensure that all 
interested parties, notably including, together with manufacturers, consumers, trade unions, 
and environmental interests, are heard during the process of approval. Over time, non-EU 
producers have been granted access to the process on an equal footing. The EU has developed 
policies to ensure that the standard setting process remains open, transparent, and non-
discriminatory. 
The approval of a standard may become an important factor in defining the market for a given 
product or service, as for instance it famously happened with the GSM standard for mobile 
communications, which has developed into the de facto global standard for mobile 
communications covering a 90% market share and over 200 countries. This contrasts sharply 
with the US system, predominantly based on proprietary standards, where companies 
compete by trying to impose their own standards on the market.  
Article 114 is a prime example of the care taken by the Treaty in seeking an appropriate balance 
between national concerns and the overriding goal of free movement.29 The legal provisions 
                                                     
28 The New Approach includes the following components: i) legislative harmonisation should be limited 
to essential (performance or functional) requirements that products must meet to enjoy free movement; 
ii) technical specifications meeting the essential requirements should be laid down in harmonised 
standards ‘mandated’ by the harmonisation directives; iii) products manufactured in compliance with 
harmonised standards would benefit from a presumption of conformity with the corresponding 
essential requirements, as well as a simplified conformity assessment procedure; iv) the application of 
harmonised standards was to remain voluntary, and the manufacturers could apply different technical 
standards to meet the requirements but would take upon themselves the burden of demonstrating their 
conformity with the directive’s essential requirements. 
29 Thus, i) in its legislative proposals, the Commission will take as a base a high level of protection (para. 
3); ii) the member states are allowed to maintain national provisions (para. 4) and to introduce new 
legislation (based on new scientific evidence, (para. 5) even after the adoption of harmonising 
legislation; iii) when this happens, the Commission normally has 6 months (12 months when the matter 
appear particularly complex and the delay does not endanger human health) to approve or reject the 
measure – a rather short time span, adopted in Amsterdam to make rebuttals more difficult; if it doesn’t 
manage to respond, the measure is deemed approved and the Commission must propose new 
harmonising legislation that takes the member state concern into account; iv) the Commission can take 
the case directly to the ECJ, however, by derogating from the normal procedure of Articles 258 and 259 
TFEU when it finds that a member state is making improper use of its powers under para.s 4 and 5; v) 
finally, harmonising legislation and even technical standards will normally contain safeguard clauses 
authorising provisional restrictions introduced for one of the non-economic reasons in Article 36 TFEU. 
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bounce back and forth between the member states and the European institutions, leaving 
considerable room for accommodation of special circumstances.  
A further element of caution has been introduced with increasing application of the 
precautionary principle whereby, even in the absence of unambiguous scientific evidence, a 
measure may be rejected or justified in view of the nature of a risk or the irreversibility of its 
effects (European Commission 2000a). The principle has made its way into the TFEU with 
reference to environmental policies (Article 191, para. 2) and has played a significant role in 
many areas of health and consumer protection, perhaps not always in the best interest of 
consumers and the economy (Pelkmans 2012). For instance, the principle de facto led to the 
exclusion of all genetically modified products from European agriculture, including limited 
cultivations for research purposes. As a result, an important branch of modern industry for 
agriculture has been pushed out of Europe. Clearly, we are confronted here with a strong 
cultural element which the SEM rules were eventually forced to accept, even if not based on 
convincing scientific evidence. 
(c) Agencies and networks of regulators 
In the second half of the past century, the role of the state in the economy has been 
characterised by a remarkable development of administrative law-based approaches to 
achieve complex policy goals, whereby the state has become increasingly active in setting 
standards for economic, social, environmental, and other matters, as well as developing 
separate executive branches for the regulation and oversight of the implementation of 
legislation. In this context, the Union has also undergone a significant transformation from a 
mainly law-producing organisation towards an organisation actively engaged in the 
administrative implementation of Union law.  
In the process, the Union has developed innovative instruments and approaches by building 
an array of regulatory networks and executive agencies entrusted with implementing tasks, 
with various forms of inclusion of national regulatory bodies. These bodies have emerged in 
an evolutionary process that has created ‘policy islands’ in diverse areas such as food safety, 
chemicals, medicines, financial market regulation, aviation safety, and border controls 
(Hofmann 2016), normally based on Article 114 TFEU. The policy approaches, regulatory and 
enforcement powers and institutional design have responded flexibly to the specific sector’s 
requirements, without a unifying model.  
Table 2 summarises the main agencies and regulatory networks of the Union, with an 
indication of their nature (forum, network, agency), organisation and regulatory powers. As 
may be seen, these bodies, while performing tasks of considerable importance for the 
functioning of the SEM, do not normally have their own supervisory and regulatory powers, 
with limited exceptions such as ESMA, which can, under certain circumstances, forbid short 
selling operations in financial markets and the European Data Protection Board, which 
approves the criteria for the accreditation of certification bodies. The mode of operation, then, 
is that agency acts are adopted under the Commission’s implementing powers delegated by 
the Council – with unwritten rules of the game whereby the Commission will normally ratify 
the agencies’ decisions without interfering, except under special circumstances. 
A feature worth mentioning concerns governance arrangements: decisions may be less incisive 
when the agency’s governing body is made up exclusively of representatives of national 
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authorities, e.g., for the ESAs for financial markets supervision. The meagre results achieved 
by these agencies in the promotion of common standards of supervision may be due precisely 
to this feature. Similar arrangements have been adopted for the Supervisory Board of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism, raising the risk of politically influenced decisions in 
individual cases. This contrasts sharply with the model set by the governing council of the 
ECB, which has, at its centre, an executive board composed of independent officials (appointed 
by the Council).  
An important issue in the development of the agency model at the Union level has been the 
‘non-delegation’ doctrine based on early decisions by the ECJ whereby i) a delegation of power 
that is too broad and insufficiently defined is prohibited (Meroni)30 and ii) agencies cannot 
adopt normative measures (Romano).31 The reason behind these judgments was that, besides 
possibly upsetting the institutional balance established by the Treaties, delegation to the 
agencies could subject their acts to the scrutiny of the ECJ.32 
 
                                                     
30 Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni and & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche Spa vs. High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community [1958]. 
31 Case 98/80, Giuseppe Romano vs. Institut National d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité [1981]. 
32 This argument is now less relevant, since the Lisbon Treaty permits judicial review of the agencies’ 
acts (cf. Article 263 para. 1 TFEU). 
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Table 2. Main EU Agencies and Networks 
 NATURE ORGANISATION/  
GOVERNANCE 
REGULATORY POWER SUPERVISORY POWER/ 
ENFORCEMENT IN INDIVIDUAL CASES 
BEREC 
Body of European Regulators 
for Electronic 
Communications 
Forum for 
cooperation among 
NRAs and Comm.; 
no legal personality; 
new proposal to 
transform BEREC 
into a fully fledged 
agency  
Board of Regulators + 
staff  
No: guidelines, best practices and 
non-binding opinions on draft 
NRAs’ and Comm. measures; 
advice to the EU institutions  
No: opinions in cross border disputes and on 
some draft decisions of the Comm. 
ACER  
Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators 
EU body with legal 
personality 
Board of Regulators + staff 
+ 
Board of Appeal 
No: contribution to network codes; 
non-binding guidelines, opinions 
and advice to the EU institutions 
Yes: individual decisions on technical issues in 
specific cross-border cases, to be challenged 
before the Board of Appeal and then the ECJ  
CPC Network 
Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Network 
Network of national 
authorities; no legal 
personality 
No board, no staff  No No. The 2016 proposal of new CPC Reg. provides 
for a common enforcement action, coordinated by 
the Comm., for cases of EU dimension  
ECN  
European Competition 
Network 
Network of Comm. 
and NCAs; mainly a 
discussion and 
cooperation forum; 
no legal personality 
No board, no staff  No: recommendations and best 
practices  
No: EU competition law is enforced by the 
Comm. and the NCAs. The Comm. intervention 
relieves NCAs of their competence 
Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party 
Advisory body, no 
legal personality  
Secretariat provided by DG 
Just. 
No: opinions to the Comm. + 
recommendations and guidelines 
No: only national authorities are competent to 
enforce EU data protection rules  
European Data Protection 
Board established by the 
2016 Reg., not yet 
operational 
Independent EU 
body with legal 
personality 
Board + staff Yes: in addition to soft law acts, the 
Board approves the criteria for the 
accreditation of certification bodies 
Yes: legally binding decisions in disputes 
between supervisory authorities 
EBA  
European Banking Authority 
ESMA  
European Securities and 
Markets Authority 
EIOPA  
European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions 
Authority 
EU agencies with 
legal personality 
Each ESA has: 
a Board of supervisors 
[national authorities, 
Comm., EU Systemic Risk 
Board, the other ESAs 
(+ECB in EBA)] + staff 
The Board of Appeal is a 
joint body of the three 
ESAs  
No: draft regulatory and 
implementing standards (not 
involving policy decisions), to be 
examined and formally adopted by 
the Comm.; opinions to the EU 
institutions  
Yes: in some circumstances ESAs adopt 
individual decisions addressed to financial 
market participants; they settle disagreements 
between national authorities in cross-border 
situations 
 
ESMA has a limited direct enforcement power for 
Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories  
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A recent decision by the ECJ33 seems to indicate some ‘mellowing’ of the non-delegation 
doctrine (Pelkmans and Simoncini 2014). The British government was seeking the annulment 
of Article 28 of the ESMA regulation, empowering the agency to forbid short selling in certain 
specific circumstances. The ECJ rejected the request, arguing that the delegation of powers is 
lawful as long as it indicates objective criteria and circumscribed conditions for their exercise, 
and these criteria are subject to judicial review. It further argued that the Council may delegate 
specific powers to EU bodies with specific technical expertise and broadened the scope of 
delegation under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
While this is a welcome development, it still falls far short of what would be needed to develop 
fully fledged independent European regulatory agencies (Pelkmans 2012). 
(d) Public services 
The Monti Report notes that “since the nineties, the place of public services within the single 
market has been a persistent irritant in the European public debate” (p. 73) but believes that 
the discussions ‘within the Treaty’ should have been settled by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon with 
the reformulation of Article 14 and Protocol 26 on services of general interest (SGI). The Report 
sees these services as an important building block for reconciling the single market and the 
social and citizenship dimension – as a component of the ‘highly competitive social market 
economy’ that the Lisbon Treaty has identified as a main objective of European integration.  
The central Treaty provision is Article 106 TFEU, which sets out the principle of (proportional) 
exemption of services of general economic interest (SGEI) from competition rules when their 
application might endanger the fulfilment of their mission. Over the years, a set of policies and 
legal principles has been developed to allow member states full freedom in deciding what is 
public service but restrictions have been placed on the means of implementation.34 Article 106 
has provided an important instrument for dismantling special and exclusive rights protecting 
national monopolies in telecoms, postal services, energy and transport. Universal service has 
been the key to political compromises underlying liberalisation: under competitive conditions 
a vastly superior range and quality of services would be made available, compared to the 
previous situation of state monopolies.  
Discussions and controversies have flourished, especially on the application of state aid rules. 
The problem has been largely resolved by the ECJ with its Altmark decision, under which 
public service compensation does not constitute state aid when certain standards are 
respected,35 and by the Commission’s subsequent efforts to design a comprehensive set of 
rules on compensation of public service obligations (with the Monti-Kroes package in 2005 
and the Almunia package in 2012).36 SEM rules also fully apply to the selection of the provider 
                                                     
33 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom vs. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2014]. 
34 Cf. European Commission (2011b) and, for the groundbreaking approach to the liberalisation of 
telecoms, Sauter (2015).  
35  Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg vs. 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
[2003]. For the Altmark exception to apply, there must be a service in the pursuit of a legitimate public 
interest objective; the parameters for compensation are set in advance, and they are based on a 
reasonable rate of return of an efficient undertaking. Cf. Sauter (2015).  
36 Cf. European Commission (2013).  
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of public services. The case law of the ECJ has consistently maintained that fundamental 
Treaty freedoms also apply to the provision of public services, placing constraints on the 
selection of providers. Accordingly, the exception for in-house provision has been narrowly 
construed and a set of principles has been developed for the selection of the providers. 
Recently, the new package of directives for public procurement of 2014 has included for the 
first e a specific directive on the award of concessions – setting for instance rules on their 
duration. 37 
The revised Article 14 TFEU has made the member states and the Union institutions jointly 
responsible “that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly 
economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their mission”; it goes on to 
state that “the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations ... shall 
establish these principles and set these conditions without prejudice to the competence of 
Member States, in compliance with the Treaties, to provide, to commission and to fund such 
services”. Thus, a paradoxical result of ten years of squabbling over the issue is that European 
institutions have acquired the power to regulate the matter; while Protocol 26 has reaffirmed 
the sole competence of the member states “to provide, commission and organise non-
economic services of general interest” (Article 2).  
(e) Establishment and company mobility 
Thanks to the early recognition of direct effect to the Treaty freedoms under Articles 49 and 
53, freedom of establishment represented an important advance in liberalisation in the IM well 
before the SEA. Two key ECJ decisions adapted the Cassis de Dijon test for restrictions to 
freedom of establishment (Gebhard, already mentioned) and the recognition of qualifications 
(Vlassopoulou),38 opening the way to subsequent ‘horizontal’ liberalisation directives.39   
Freedom of establishment, however, only goes so far as to allow the incoming entity to enter 
and operate without restrictions – subject to the safeguard of measures adopted on grounds 
of public policy or public health provided for by Article 52 TFEU – “under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where … establishment is effected”.40 In 
other words, freedom of establishment liberalises entry into domestic markets, thereby 
increasing competition in the markets defined by existing national rules, but does not entail 
per se either the mutual recognition or the harmonisation of those national rules. Therefore, in 
service markets, where significant restrictions still limit the free supply of cross-border 
services, freedom of establishment alone wouldn’t have guaranteed full market integration; to 
this end, directives liberalising the provision of specific services, and eventually the Services 
Directive, were also needed.   
The provision of certain services is subject in most countries to regulatory requirements and 
constraints on the quality and competence of the provider, natural or legal person. A major 
regulatory innovation has been the establishment of common licence arrangements – the 
‘European passport’ – for the main categories of financial services, based on minimal 
                                                     
37 Directive 2014/23/EU. 
38 Case C- 340/89 Vlassopoulou vs. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- u. Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg [1991]. 
39 Directives 2005/36/EC and 2013/55/EU. 
40 Article 49 TFEU. 
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harmonisation of national licences. Under this system, an institution meeting the minimal 
prudential requirements (capital, reserves, quality of management, etc.) can set up branches 
and subsidiaries freely throughout the Union without further authorisation.41 
On company mobility, the Treaty approach was predicated on outright hostility to companies 
moving the main centre of operation to another member state, but a number of ECJ decisions 
have opened broad breaches into restrictions on the free choice of legal seat by EU 
corporations. At the root of this contradiction lies a fundamental difference in national legal 
systems between those adhering to the so-called ‘real seat’ doctrine (e.g. France, Germany and 
Italy) whereby the legal seat of a company coincides with its headquarters and main centre of 
operations, and the ‘incorporation’ doctrine, whereby the legal seat is simply where the 
company was incorporated (adopted e.g. by the UK and the Netherlands). 
Earlier ECJ decisions (i.e. Daily Mail and Cartesio)42 had confirmed the power of national 
authorities to regulate companies maintaining their legal seat in the country. Therefore, they 
could legitimately impose restrictions on companies wishing to transfer of the main centre of 
operation while maintaining their legal seat (primary establishment) in the country of origin, 
could not prevent a company from converting into a company of another member state. 
Moreover, national authorities cannot require the winding up or liquidation of a company 
wishing to exit. 
With Centros,43 the ECJ went much further with regard to the freedom to combine primary 
and secondary establishment so as to minimise the costs and legal requirements of 
incorporation, while exercising its activities elsewhere. Centros was a private company 
incorporated in the UK, whose branch in Denmark was its only centre of activity. This 
arrangement had been designed to escape costly capital requirements under Danish law. The 
Danish registrar of companies refused to register the company’s branch on grounds that it 
really was its main centre of activity. However, the ECJ ruled that the registrar’s refusal 
violated freedom of establishment. It said that it wasn’t a case of abuse since the rule that was 
being circumvented concerned the formation of the company and not the pursuit of certain 
trades. The decision has called into question the continuing applicability of the real seat 
doctrine; some have seen this decision as opening the door to a Delaware-style race to the 
bottom. 
The Commission has been pondering what to do about this situation, but has been unable to 
decide on a legislative initiative to clarify matters. The issue is broader than the transfer of the 
legal seat, as it also involves questions of cross-border mergers and divisions.44  
Resistance to making progress on this road is motivated by the potential impact on established 
forms of protection of workers’ rights, e.g. the German system of workers’ participation in 
                                                     
41 The system has now been extended to virtually all institutions offering financial and investment 
services: starting in the 1990s with the banking and insurance directives and private investment funds 
(UCITS), and continuing in the 2000s with ‘occupational’ pension funds and alternative investment 
funds (hedge funds and private equity), security issuance (the prospectus directive), and investment 
services – with directives covering stock exchanges (MiFID) and post-trading actors (CSDR). 
42 Respectively Case 81/87, The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex 
parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1988] and Case C-201/06, Commission vs. France [2008]. 
43 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd vs. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999]. 
44 For a comprehensive review of these matters, see Schmidt (2016).  
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corporate supervisory boards. The European Company Statute is a case in point: the eventual 
agreement, reached after twenty years of stalemate, includes the regulation providing for 
limited harmonisation of corporate rules (e.g. minimum capital, the choice of dual vs. single 
board, the transfer of legal seat) 45  and a tightly prescriptive Directive on workers 
participation.46 The European company may be created only by transformation of existing 
companies, rather than creation of a new company; and the legal seat can be transferred but 
must coincide with the ‘central administration’ (i.e. the main centre of operation). In any event, 
the European Company may be constituted only after reaching an agreement on a model for 
worker involvement in management decisions, entailing the ‘grandfathering’ of existing 
statutory protections. In the event of a transfer of the legal seat to another country, the transfer 
project must indicate the consequences for workers. 
Similarly, the Takeover Bid Directive47 was emasculated in frantic last-minute negotiations 
with provisions allowing member states and individual companies not to apply its key 
provisions – i.e. the ‘passivity rule’ preventing the board from adopting defensive measures 
without the consent of shareholders, and the ‘breakthrough rule’, suspending all limitations 
on the exercise of voting rights by shareholders on the occasion of the bid. 
All this draws attention to the limits placed on the integration process by rigid labour market 
institutions: as long as labour is protected by rigid hiring and firing rules, then mobility of 
capital for direct investment will likely be restrained, so as to limit cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions that may endanger existing protections. As convincingly argued by Hall and 
Soskice (2001), changes in market institutions are sometimes complicated by 
complementarities between them; changing one in isolation therefore becomes quite difficult.  
(f) On the posting of workers 
A source of persistent tension between free movement and national protective arrangements 
is the Posted Workers Directive;48 it impinges directly on the most sensitive issue of labour 
mobility, which in the European environment of rigid labour markets remains deeply 
unpopular and is strongly resisted. 
In Rush Portuguesa49 the ECJ affirmed that Articles 56 and 57 TFEU “preclude a Member State 
from prohibiting a person providing services established in another Member State from 
moving freely on its territory with all of his staff”, notably including non-EU nationals, to carry 
out a service contract. Posted workers cannot seek access to the host labour market and must 
return to the place of origin or residence once the contract is completed. The decision, however, 
maintained that Union law does not preclude member states from extending their own labour 
legislation, or collective labour agreements, to workers employed temporarily in the country. 
The directive went further and removed that discretion, establishing instead that the member 
state must apply to posted workers a ‘nucleus of mandatory rules’ relating to the minimum 
                                                     
45 Regulation (EC) 2157/2001. 
46 Directive 2001/86/EC. 
47 Directive 2004/25/EC. 
48 Directive 96/71/EC. 
49 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ld. vs. Office national d’immigration [1990].  
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wage, working time, and equal treatment, and only collective agreements satisfying certain 
conditions.  
Then the Laval dispute arose, setting a Latvian firm that had won a contract in Sweden against 
local labour unions. The ECJ ruled that the host state could only insist on the application of 
national labour laws for matters exhaustively listed in Article 3(1) of the Directive; this did not 
cover certain supplements and insurance premiums, and in addition Sweden had failed to 
establish the minimum wage in that activity with the procedure of the directive. 50  More 
broadly, local unions’ demands fell outside the scope of the directive and, therefore, industrial 
action to enforce national collective agreements was incompatible with Article 56 TFEU. 
Viking was a Finnish company wishing to reflag to reduce labour costs; the decision was met 
with a seamen’s union strike. The ECJ again ruled that the trade union’s proposed strike was 
a restriction on freedom of establishment. It stated that, while in principle action to protect the 
jobs and conditions of employment by union members liable to be affected by reflagging could 
be justified in order to protect workers, such a view would no longer be valid if it were 
established that the jobs and employment conditions were not jeopardised or threatened in 
practice.51 
These cases have exposed deep fault lines between the SEM and the social dimension at 
national level (Monti 2010). With the progressive liberalisation of services, the divergent social 
and employment conditions in member states offer fresh opportunities to reduce labour costs, 
calling into the line of fire the more generous protections. The implication that union strike 
rules would have to adapt to SEM requirements invites enormous controversy and opposition.  
Following the Monti Report, the Commission undertook to propose revisions to the Posted 
Workers Directive, e.g. by setting time limits (twenty four months) after which the host 
country’s remuneration and other labour laws would automatically apply to the contract in 
question, and excluding temporary agencies posting workers from the application of the 
directive. However, perhaps predictably, the proposal met with strong opposition from East 
European member states: fourteen chambers of national parliaments from eleven member 
states issued a ‘yellow card’ against the Commission’s proposal, for violating subsidiarity 
(under Treaty Protocol 2).   
3. The Economic Impact of the Single European Market 
Almost thirty years have elapsed since the enactment of the SEA, which brought about a jump 
in integration in the EU through the creation of the SEM. The preceding exposé shows the 
enormous progress achieved through legislation now covering all the main sectors of activity, 
as well as horizontal inducements for innovation and new technologies. And yet, the 
performance of the EU economy remains far from satisfactory and the legacy of the economic 
and financial crisis still looms large. Output and productivity growth have been 
unsatisfactory, unemployment remains high in a number of countries, investment levels have 
not recovered to pre-crisis levels, and financial markets are fragmented by confidence factors, 
                                                     
50 Case 341/05. 
51 Case C-438/05. 
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reflecting large sovereign debts and dubious capital and asset positions in parts of the banking 
system (OECD 2016).  
Of course, the SEM policies cannot be held responsible for all that does not work, nor could 
they claim all the merit for what seemingly works well in economic integration. The creation 
of the SEM was expected to bring about distinct economic benefits on a number of fronts, 
including cost reductions through the elimination of border tariffs and regulatory barriers; 
economies of scale, as companies restructure and merge to exploit the larger market size and 
optimise their cross-border productive structure and logistics; efficiency increases due to 
stiffer competition; increased labour and capital mobility for cross-border direct investment; 
and lower financial transaction costs as a result of the liberalisation of capital flows and greater 
financial integration, possibly with an increased role of capital markets in the direct financing 
of business (equity and bonds). The euro was expected to boost the beneficial effects on all of 
these fronts, thanks to full price transparency. 
While there has been progress on all of these fronts, the attendant benefits seem to have been 
less than hoped for and, moreover, to have affected some countries, regions and activities quite 
diversely. This was to be expected. Large countries are better positioned to gain from 
economies of scale, given the larger size of their companies, while small open economies 
would benefit more from the reduction in transaction costs engendered by falling barriers to 
trade. Adjustment costs would be higher in countries with closed markets and protected 
industries. The twin forces of globalisation and technical change have also played a major role 
in changing the economic environment, magnifying the different capacities of EU member 
states to meet the challenge. Again, company size significantly influences the ability to manage 
new technologies and distributed production organisations made possible by globalisation.   
Labour market flexibility is a critical variable in determining a country’s ability to meet the 
challenge of a rapidly changing economic environment. The labour market economic literature 
describes the differing levels of efficiency of four labour market protective arrangements, 
observed in managing labour relocations when companies and activities in Europe need 
restructuring: the Anglo-Saxon flexible model, the flexi-security model of Nordic European 
countries, the consensual corporatist model practised in Germany and other continental 
countries, and the ‘Southern’ model (Sapir 2003). The last one is characterised by the rigid 
defence of existing jobs and the maximum resistance to industrial restructuring, leading most 
often to chronic unemployment and public sector deficits to support ailing companies and no 
longer viable jobs. More generally, the benefits of market opening measures can be profoundly 
affected by domestic policies, which can aid competitive adjustments or tame them with 
countervailing protective measures.  
Against this background, disentangling the specific economic impact of the SEM is almost 
impossible. A less ambitious substitute is to examine the degree of success of SEM polices in 
fostering market opening reforms in EU countries on the one hand, to review countries’ 
growth and productivity performance to identify areas of more visible weakness, on the other.   
(a) Market opening under Single Market legislation 
Over the past three decades progress in enacting market opening legislation in the SEM has 
been impressive, as has been shown, and most economic activities are now covered by SEM 
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rules. A new ambitious strategy for the digital market aims to extend market opening to online 
transactions, which would in itself represent a leap in market integration.  
However, implementation of legislation has been uneven, as shown by extensive reviews of 
remaining SEM barriers undertaken by the OECD, the European Commission and private 
analysts (cf. Europe Economics 2013, European Commission 2015(b) and (c), Ilzkovitz et al. 
2007, OECD 2016, Pelkmans 2012). 
Mutual recognition plays an important role in the functioning of the SEM for both 
manufactured products (covering about one quarter of intra-EU trade) and services, especially 
in the recognition of qualifications. However, its practical implementation is hampered by 
legal uncertainties, bureaucratic resistance and a lack of awareness among individuals, 
companies and public administrations – despite strengthened efforts to streamline its 
application with Regulation (EC) 764/2008. The services directive has not yet succeeded in 
clearing the ground of excessive or outright illegal authorisation requirements to start 
businesses, limitations to the duration of authorisations and requirements to register with local 
chambers or professional associations. Extensive restrictions are still reported for legal, 
accounting, engineering and architect services. The implementation of procurement directives 
has remained uneven, with a number of countries falling well below average in the share of 
public procurement contacts published for open bidding. Retail establishment rules remain 
very restrictive in some countries. Lack of adequate physical interconnections hampers the 
establishment of a functioning SEM for energy. Excessive red tape still impedes market entry 
across the board.  
The quality of regulation is also not always satisfactory, imposing sometimes disproportionate 
burdens on businesses without adequate evaluation of expected benefits, e.g. the REACH 
regulation for tracing chemical products or the rules for clinical trials. The Commission’s 
efforts to base new legislation on adequate impact assessment have often been frustrated, 
owing to the Council’s and Parliament’s lack of willingness to cooperate. Regulatory 
instability has been high, in response to contingent political demands by the member states, 
creating uncertainty and higher risks for investors, especially for projects with long time-
horizons. 
OECD analyses have also highlighted the adverse impact of ‘regulatory creep’ – national 
actions that add to the burden of regulation by adding unnecessary requirements (‘gold 
plating’) or failing to remove inconsistent higher level regulations. Regulatory fragmentation 
and disproportionate restrictions across the SEM continue to hamper the opportunity to 
expand business in specific sectors, notably in the transport sector overburdened by load and 
size limits, traffic restrictions, local restrictions in ports and complex administrative 
procedures. In rail transport, lack of interoperability between systems holds back cross-border 
freight. 
Several barriers continue to impede the development of e-commerce – which will hopefully 
be dealt with by the new programme for the Digital Single Market. In this regard, data 
localisation requirements that force companies to store and process data in servers physically 
located inside particular member states are very detrimental to the development and growth 
of new businesses. Some member states are also unduly restricting or forbidding the online 
sale of certain products, e.g. veterinary products. 
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An issue that deserves continuing attention is the limited cross-border mobility of productive 
factors, labour and capital. Labour mobility in the EU remains low, reflecting cultural and 
linguistic barriers on the one hand, and the lack of harmonisation of professional qualifications 
and supplementary pension entitlements on the other (OECD 2016, Dhéret et al. 2013, Ilzkovitz 
et al. 2007).  
Under the revised professional qualifications directive, member states are now held to stricter 
requirements of justification when they want to limit access to professional activities, but the 
number of recognitions remains low, relative to employment, and the process of recognition 
appears slow and cumbersome, with great variation amongst member states. A paradoxical 
result of differing rules is that nationals from countries with a more liberal regime of 
recognition may confront greater hurdles when trying to enter the market of another country 
with a more restrictive regime. For example, engineering is not a regulated profession in some 
member states while in others is regulated through licensing.  
The Union also seems rather ineffective at attracting high-skilled personnel from third-country 
nationals. Effective deployment of the new European Professional Card (for EU residents) and 
the Blue Card scheme (for third-country nationals) could improve matters on all these fronts. 
The risk of losing supplementary pension rights and long vesting periods for acquiring new 
rights are strong disincentives to seek work abroad; Directive 2014/50/EU (to be transposed 
by 2018) improves matters somewhat by establishing certain minimum standards for the 
protection of mobile workers’ rights.  
In general, differing protections of unemployment and health risks and low portability of 
attendant rights represent a major barrier to the free movement of labour. On this, Pelkmans 
(2012) called attention to the fact that Article 3 TEU includes among the founding values of the 
Union free movement of ‘persons’, rather than ‘workers’; that Article 45 TFEU has been 
regarded as less of a priority by the Council and Parliament; and that the workers employed 
abroad will operate normally under a broad form of host-country control, whose effect is that 
of protecting national labour market regulations. This is the main motivation behind the 
Parliaments’ rejection of the country-of-origin principle in the Services Directive, which was 
included in the Commission’s original proposal. It is also the reason behind growing demands 
to change the Posted Workers Directive to include stronger enforcement of local (host-country) 
working conditions. 
Of course, the preservation of national protective systems is inconsistent with the creation of 
an integrated market for labour. An important consequence, sometimes overlooked by SEM 
analysts, is that whenever SEM legislation comes too close to challenging rigid labour market 
institutions, implementation may become very slow – as has often been the case with free 
establishment, which still largely relies on host country control for business conduct rules and 
the free cross-border supply of services (on this see also Pelkmans 2008). 
This is also in all likelihood an important explanation for the general disfavour for unfettered 
(real) capital mobility, as reflected in the treaty and legislative provisions on company 
mobility, as has been discussed. This has not prevented a significant increase in intra-EU direct 
investment, within a global trend of strongly rising FDI flows, as well as cross-border M&A 
operations. Cross-border flows were especially significant in the early years of the SEM 
programme and, later on, for the new entrants with the 2004 enlargement, reflecting the 
outsourcing of manufacturing activity and the acquisition of substantial stakes in domestic 
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banks by EU-15 corporations. However, important components of the corporate structure, 
especially in the EU-15, remain closed to foreign acquisitions, e.g. in the network utility 
services, where in some member states the state still holds large stakes in national monopolies 
and foreign acquisitions of incumbent ‘champions’ would be discouraged.  
Financial market remains fragmented along national lines as a result of the financial crises in 
2008-09 and 2011-12, which have left a legacy of high public and private debts, as well as lack 
of confidence in the sovereigns and the banking systems of the southern periphery of the euro 
area. Banking Union, already quite advanced with the establishment of the Single Supervisory 
System and the Single Resolution Mechanism, and the ongoing project for the creation of an 
effective Capital Market Union, are expected to remove these market segmentations, which 
for the time being still play a significant role in constraining SME access to financing and 
depressing growth. 
(b) Economic effects of the Single European Market 
The economic literature generally agrees that the SEM has had a positive effect on the economy 
of its members, although there is wide disagreement on quantification.  
Strong positive effects are evident in intra-EU trade for goods (Eichengreen and Boltho 2008), 
which between 1992 and 2012 increased from 12 to 22% of GDP; the increase had been even 
stronger in the preceding decades, characterised by intensive trade liberalisation measures 
internationally, and actually slowed down afterwards (Vetter 2013). It has been estimated that 
since 1960 exports and imports within the Union have climbed to a level 8% higher than they 
would have been without the SEM (Straathof et al. 2008). Fournier et al. (2015) have estimated 
an overall impact of accession to the European Economic Area of roughly 60% increase in trade 
intensity; however, they also find that regulatory restrictions and regulatory heterogeneity still 
represent an important impediment to trade.  
The numbers are much smaller for trade in services, which represent about 6% of Union GDP, 
but have shown steady increases in recent years, with little adverse impact from the twin crises 
of the past decade. Business services have been one of the most dynamic components.   
In the 2000s, intra-EU trade between EU-15 countries has remained unchanged at around 20% 
of GDP, while strong increases were observed for the incoming EU-13 countries; thus, in recent 
years the latter countries account for much of the trade creation in the SEM (European 
Commission 2015c).   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been the most important driver of internationalisation and 
integration of the European economy, with yearly flows rising from around 1% of GDP in the 
1980s to around 5% of GDP till the financial crisis. FDI inflows have also represented an 
important component of total fixed capital formation, some 10%, with a peak of 40% in 2000. 
The launch of the SEM programme and the two enlargements (in 1995 and 2004) resulted in 
substantial anticipation effects, which subsided once the main integration steps were 
accomplished. The increasing share of intra-EU FDI flows in total flows suggests that the SEM 
has played a role; indeed, in the middle of the 1990s and the middle of the 2000s, the share of 
intra-EU-15 flows rose from around 50% to 68% of total FDI outflows, and to 78% for FDI 
inflows (Ilzkovitz et al. 2007). As with trade, the financial crises have taken a heavy toll for EU-
15 FDI investment flows, while those to the EU-13 (new entrants) have been fairly steady. The 
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latter have been dominated by mergers and acquisitions of existing companies, while green-
field investment has been more important for the EU-15. 
The degree of integration is normally gauged by the observed degree of convergence of prices, 
wages and productivity. The aggregate price level convergence has slowly improved through 
the 1990s and the 2000s until the financial crisis; afterwards, it stabilised in the euro area and 
has even gone into reverse in the EU-28, probably reflecting exchange rate adjustments 
between the euro and the non-euro currencies (Chart 1). However, as may be seen, price 
dispersion remains well above that observed for the United States and Canada – confirming 
once again that integration in the SEM still is still far from fulfilling its potential. 
Figure 1. Aggregate price level convergence (coefficient of variation, %) 
 
 
The coefficient of variation indicates the extent of variability relative to the mean of a series. Here the 
series shown are the price level index of household final consumption expenditure for the EU-28 and 
EA-19, the implicit regional price deflator for the US and the intercity index of price differentials of 
consumer goods and services for Canada.  
Source: OECD Economic Surveys: European Union 2016.  
Wage data show increased convergence within the EU-15 form the early 90s, and a 
considerable increase in dispersion with the enlargement to the EU-13 in the 2000s (Europe 
Economics 2013).  
Financial services show greater variation in the covariance index, with a rapid convergence 
between the 1970s and the late 1980s, then a sharp increase in divergence until 1993-4, followed 
by a sharp decline through 1997, and mildly increasing dispersion up to the middle of the 
2000s. The explanation of this greater variability may perhaps lie in the sharp movements in 
exchange rates in the early 1990s, followed by the inception of the euro. It is not unreasonable 
to think that these momentous changes may have affected the remuneration of staff in the 
financial services industry, with larger gains in the financial centres. In any events, wage 
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dispersion remains substantial and seems to go well beyond what could be expected in a well-
integrated SEM.  
Productivity, on the other hand, did not converge at all, and in fact showed growing 
divergences within industries and across countries, especially within the euro area (cf. total 
factor productivity indexes in Figure 2, upper quadrant). This seems to have been mainly the 
result of applying one monetary policy to areas with different price and cost dynamics. On the 
one hand, the inception of the euro all but eliminated risk premia over borrowing in higher 
inflation countries, whose borrowers could thus get loans at negative real interest rates for low 
quality projects. On the other hand, the rise in the relative price of manufactured products in 
higher inflation countries encourage a shift in the allocation of resources towards services and 
construction, typically characterised by lower productivity. 
Table 3 reports some sectoral data of productivity growth in the EU and the US in 1980-95 and 
1995-2005. As may be seen, the labour and total factor productivity (TFP) slowed down 
between the two periods in the Union and accelerated in the US. The disaggregated data for 
labour productivity indicate that the main component of the gap with the US was in 
distribution (retail) services, where in the US fierce competition was set in motion by the 
application of the new ICT technologies to logistics, parcel delivery and inventory 
management. The last line of the table brings together the contributions to labour productivity 
increases of technology – from changing labour skills, ICT capital per hour worked and TFP. 
This highlights the growing technology gap that has developed relative to the US, in a period 
of dramatic technological change, owing to insufficient competition and closed markets in the 
Union.  
Table 3. Productivity growth in the market economy (annual average growth rates, %) 
 EU  US  
 1980-1995  1995-2005  1980-1995  1995-2005  
Labour productivity  2.5 1.5 1.9 2.9 
TFP  1.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 
Market services labour productivity  1.4 1.0 1.5 3.0 
of which due to:      
distribution services  1.1 0.7 1.2 1.5 
finance and business services  0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 
personal services  -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 
Contribution of the knowledge 
economy to labour productivity growth  
1.7 1.1 1.6 2.6 
EU refers to: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK. 
The contribution to the knowledge economy includes TFP, improvement in labour skills and ICT capital 
per hour worked.   
Source: Timmer M.P., R. Inklaar, M. O’Mahony and B. van Ark (2010), Economic Growth in Europe, 
Cambridge University Press.  
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Figure 2a. Total factor productivity (1996=100) 
 
Source: The Conference Board. 
Figure 2b. Quality of institutions (2014, %) 
 
Estimate of governance ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.  
Source: Our updating and reclassification of figure from Boltho and Carlin (2012). 
As a result, labour costs and competitive conditions showed large and increasing divergences, 
leading to growing external imbalances and, eventually, to Europe-specific acute financial 
instability. This must reflect, in turn, structural divergences in national macro-economic 
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policies and national protections able to insulate markets and industries from the competitive 
pressures stemming from the SEM. Thus, the ultimate obstacle to reaping the full benefits of 
the SEM lie in national economic policies sustaining inflation differentials and market 
segmentations, in direct contrast to integration in the SEM.  
The increasingly divergent course of national policies within the euro area is also confirmed 
by observed changes in the quality of institutions, as measured by World Bank indicators 
(Figure 2, lower quadrant). The figure reports four indicators, namely respect of the rule of 
law; the control of corruption; the quality of regulation; and the effectiveness of government, 
and for each indicator compares the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ (PIIGS) of the euro area.52 The 
striking feature is that the periphery not only had a worse quality of institutions than the core 
from the start, but the gap widened over time. 
Further evidence pointing in the same direction is provided by the new composite indicators 
of financial integration developed by the ECB (FINTECs), focusing on the four most important 
segments of the financial markets, namely money, bonds, equity and banking markets (ECB 
2015); the indicators, which separately cover prices (interest rates) and quantities (portfolio 
flows), are reported in Figure 3. As may be seen, the price-based indicator shows higher 
volatility, rising continuously from the second part of the 1990s (clearly, in anticipation of 
monetary union), falling precipitously with the global financial crisis (2008-09) and crushing 
with the euro area sovereign debt crisis (2010-12). It still is well below the pre-crisis level. The 
quantity-based indicator appears more stable; it is interesting that it flattened, but did not fall 
after the global financial crisis, while it did recede after the sovereign debt crisis (which indeed 
saw an interruption of money market and interbank financial flows between core and 
periphery). It is now slowly recovering. 
Figure 3. Price- and quantity-based FINTECs 
 
FINTEC stands for FINancial INTEgration Composite. The price-based FINTEC aggregates ten 
indicators covering the period 1995-Q1 – 2014-Q4, and the quantity-based FINTEC aggregates five 
indicators available from the 1999-Q1 to the 2014-Q3. For a detailed description of the FINTEC and its 
input data, see Statistical Annex of ECB (2015).  
Source: ECB (2015). 
                                                     
52 The core includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands; the periphery 
(PIGS), Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.  
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Banking Union has been successful in turning both indicators upward again; however, the 
ECB policies of quantitative easing may be overstating the return of integration to the extent 
that they artificially swell asset prices and depress yields on riskier assets from the periphery. 
In this regard, the Capital Markets Union initiatives can play a complementary role in fostering 
truly integrated capital markets by pushing the development of the cross-border bond and 
equity market segments, thus increasing the scope of private risk sharing in cushioning the 
impact of new idiosyncratic financial shocks. 
While market opening and integration are expected to set in motion beneficial micro-economic 
effects – mainly by increasing competitive pressures and improving resource allocation – a 
number of factors previously described may impede the translation of these stimuli into 
improved macro-economic performance.  
The Cecchini Report (1988) held the promise that the removal of frontier controls, the 
liberalisation of public procurement and financial services, and the supply effects deriving 
from market responses to the new competitive environment, would raise EU-12 GDP by 
between 4.25 and 6.5% and create 2 million jobs. Most subsequent analyses have come to the 
conclusion that the actual outcome was smaller, around 2% (Vetter 2013, Ilzkovitz et al. 2007); 
but higher estimates have not been absent. Most notably, Eichengreen and Boltho (2008) 
gauged that European integration has added at least 5% of extra GDP growth, although they 
recognise that much trade opening would probably have happened anyway.  
Mariniello et al. (2015) pointed out two developments that may help explain why the outcome 
has fallen short of expectations. One is the dramatic increase in the share of the economy of 
services, which are largely non-tradables, and now typically represent some 70% or more of 
advanced economies’ GDP. The other, already recalled, is that national policies in many 
domains have not been supportive of the goal of integration. They mention in this regard 
undue rents, rigid labour market rules, industrial policies supporting national champions, 
including monopolistic supply of network services, and cumbersome procedures to set up 
new businesses, among the main factors hampering the competitive process and its ‘creative 
destruction’ dynamic effects.  
They point out the fact that SMEs are often protected from the competitive forces within the 
SEM as a potentially counterproductive policy, arguing that they could not otherwise survive. 
However, the question arises as to whether these policies are leading to sub-optimal results, 
e.g. by reducing the ability to exploit economies of scale. Similarly, inefficient regulation of 
network utility services (e.g. in telecoms) may create fresh market segmentations, rather than 
removing those already there. 
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Conclusions 
Over the past thirty years, the SEM has made impressive progress, growing to cover the main 
economic activities, from manufactured goods to all categories of services, network utilities 
and public services, public procurement and the recognition of professional qualifications, as 
well as the market for codified technology, that for long lagged behind. A new ambitious 
initiative now aims to establish a fully fledged online digital market. 
Implementation, however, has been wanting. Globalisation, technological change and the 
financial crises have impoverished the working classes and seemingly drained all appetite for 
further market opening. National policies have all too often been insufficiently supportive, if 
not downright hostile, towards the goal of market integration. As a result, the past ten years 
have seen little progress in market opening within the Union, even in areas where there would 
be low-hanging fruit to pick – e.g. the completion of the SEM for natural gas and electricity. 
The Monti Report (2010) has called attention to the need to address social resistance to further 
integration by aiming for a more acceptable equilibrium between market opening and the 
protection of the rights and interests of working classes, thus re-establishing the full meaning 
of the Union’s goal of a highly competitive social market economy. 
The ambition to push forward the goal of a genuine Single European Market – harnessing the 
joint commitment of EU institutions and national governments and administrations – has not 
been abandoned, and still finds powerful advocates in academia (cf. Pelkmans 2016) as well 
as the European Parliament (see the High Level Panel of Experts 2016).  But resuming progress 
will continue to be an uphill battle as long as the Union fails to lift its growth rates and show 
greater ability to combat unemployment and bring relief to the standards of living of working 
classes. 
Herein lies a paradox: while the SEM would in itself be a powerful engine for higher growth 
and better employment prospects, without higher growth it is not likely to find sufficient 
support among European citizens. This increases the risk that protectionism will return and 
that the Union will slide into a phase of regression.  
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